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Introduction-Global Constitutionalism from an
Interdisciplinary Perspective
ANNE PETERS* & KLAUS ARMINGEON**
This issue discusses the process and substance of global constitutionalism from
an interdisciplinary perspective.' The contributions look at international law and
governance through constitutionalist spectacles. These spectacles have normative
and empirical-analytical lenses. Seen through the normative lens of lawyers, a con-
stitutionalist reading of current international law is, to some extent, an academic
artifact. It has a creative moment, even if it only emphasizes certain characteristics of
international law. From a legal perspective, such an intellectual construct is nothing
unusual. If we accept the hermeneutic premise that a naked meaning of a text, inde-
pendent of the reader, does not exist, then the reconstruction of some portions of
international law as international constitutional law is just an ordinary hermeneutic
exercise. It is a legitimate form of interpretation, not a distortion of norms that are
"objectively" something else.
Seen through the empirical-analytical lens, the major question is whether
there is strong empirical evidence for the emergence of an effective constitution
beyond the nation-state. The term "effective constitution" denotes the idea that
these constitutional rules make a difference for individuals and are not just cheap
talk by politicians.
Most analyses of constitutionalism are written by legal scholars. Only recently,
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social scientists, and in particular political scientists, have joined the debate.
Constitutionalism is an important theme for political scientists in various re-
spects. In contrast to legal scholars, social scientists tend to put emphasis on em-
pirical rather than normative aspects of constitutionalism; they try to explain
variations in constitutionalization or to identify the empirical impacts of consti-
tutions beyond the nation-state. In theoretical terms, their analyses are framed
by at least three major controversies. The first of these controversies arises in the
research on international relations; the second debate relates to democratic the-
ory; and the third dispute concerns research of comparative politics and analysis
of multilevel governance.
The realist, liberal, and constructivist schools in international relations dis-
agree as to whether international rules and their effects can be explained by the
pursuit of national interests of states or whether internal dynamics of interna-
tional organizations and regimes limit and even hurt national interests.
Researchers in the field of democratic theory disagree about the chances for a
democratic international order. One school of thought argues that requirements for
democracy are not met beyond the level of nation-states and in all likelihood will
not be met in the near future. Others either deny the necessity of democratic inter-
national rule, which is more than governance through intergovernmental deals be-
tween (democratically elected) national governments, or they see chances for
cosmopolitan democracy.
Multilevel governance is not a theory; rather, it is a label for the joint and inter-
connected governance of subnational, national, regional, and global political actors.
From the perspective of researchers in comparative politics, one of the most contro-
versial questions concerns the extent to which national politics and policies are influ-
enced by other layers of governance. In addition, explaining interaction effects of the
various layers is one of the most important research fields.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
FROM CONSTITUTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM
As the debate on global constitutionalism suffers from conceptual confusion,
we need to clarify the key terms "constitution," "constitutionalism," and "constitu-
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tionalization" in advance.2 All these terms are "evaluative-descriptive terms" that
inevitably evaluate whatever they are employed to describe.3
Writing in 1758, Emer de Vattel explained: "The fundamental law which de-
termines the manner in which the public authority is to be exercised is what forms
the constitution of the State." Extrapolating this concept to the international politi-
cal process, the bulk of the most important norms which regulate political activity
and relationships in the global polity could be called an international constitution.
Indeed, there is a longstanding tradition in international legal scholarship of doing
so.' However, an international or global constitution cannot be gained by simply
scaling up a typical state constitution. We must be aware of the problems of transla-
tion. This is one reason why we prefer the term "constitutional law" to "constitu-
tion." We seek to highlight that this body of law is not codified in one single
document, but is dispersed in various treaties, soft law texts, and customary law. In
particular, the U.N. Charter is not the World Constitution. Global constitutional
law is a subset of international rules and principles which are so important that they
deserve the label "constitutional. 6
State constitutions are very diverse. However, they share some family resem-
blances. They (roughly) set in place political institutions and define their compe-
tences, lay down the terms of membership, establish the relations between the
members and the community, and (again roughly) regulate the institution's core
functions of lawmaking, conflict resolution, and law enforcement.7 Finally and im-
2. For excellent conceptual analyses see Daniel Bodansky, Is There an International Environ-
mental Constitution?, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 565 (2009); Anne van Aaken, Defiragmenta-
tion of Public International Law Through Interpretation: A Methodological Proposal, 16 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 483 (2009).
3. See QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS: REGARDING METHOD 148 (2002).
4. "[Lie reglement fondamental qui determine la mani~re dont l'Autorit6 Publique doit tre
exerc&e est ce qui forme la Constitution de l'Etat." EMER DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRIN-
CIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE: APPLIQUiS A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES Sou-
VERAINS Livre 1, ch. 3, § 27 (James Brown Scott ed., Carnegie Inst. 1916) (1758).
5. See GEORGES SCELLE, PRICIS DE DROIT DES GENS: PRINCIPES ET SYSTEMATIQUE 4,9-11 (1934); AL-
FRED VERDROSS, Preface to DIE VERFASSUNG DER V6LKERRECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT (1926); Sir Humphrey
Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA
HAYE RECUEIL DES COURS 1961, at 5, 7 (1962).
6. Whether these norms (rules and principles) of potential constitutional quality are superior to
ordinary international norms; whether they are created by states or by other actors as well; whether
they are always "hard" legal norms; whether they embody a specific set of material principles; and
whether they are "constitutional" only to the extent that they are enforceable by some form of ju-
dicial review, remains to be seen.
7. Cf. GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 505 (1914) ("Die Verfassung des Staates urn-
fast demnach in der Regel die Rechtssatze, welche die obersten Organe des Staates bezeichnen,
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portantly, constitutions contain rules for their own amendment. In the international
legal order, we find rules and principles which deal with exactly these questions,
albeit often in a rudimentary form. These rules may be viewed as global constitu-
tional law. Global constitutional law overlaps with global administrative law, which
is understood as "comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting
social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global
administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of
transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effec-
tive review of the rules and decisions they make."8 We submit that core principles
such as due process, proportionality, legality, and transparency are both administra-
tive and constitutional in nature. Also, any administration should generally be in-
formed by constitutional values. It is therefore difficult, and maybe not even
necessary, to distinguish sharply between the global administrative law movement
and global constitutionalism, to which we now turn.
"Constitutionalism"9 is both a mode of governance and an intellectual move-
ment. Constitutionalism is not about observing data in a constitutional landscape,
but is necessarily itself a constitutive process.'" Historically, constitutionalism was
the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political quest for a written constitution of
a nation-state. The basic purpose of the constitution was to make political power
(the monarchy) subject to the law, hence creating a government of laws, not of men.
In order to reach that objective, the constitution was to embody certain material
principles, most importantly the separation of powers and checks and balances.
Contemporary constitutionalism may be considered a "mindset," "a tradition and a
sensibility about how to act in a political world."" It is important to realize that the
die Art ihrer Schopfung, ihr gegenseitiges Verh~iltnis und ihren Wirkungskreis festsetzen, ferner
die grundsatzliche Stellung des einzelnen zur Staatsgewalt.").
8. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005).
9. See Olivier Beaud, Constitution et constitutionnalisme, in DICTIONNAIRE DE PHILOSOPHIE POLI-
TIQUE 133 (Philippe Raynaud & St~phane Rials eds., 2003); Gerhard Casper, Constitutionalism, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 473 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986); Ulrich K.
Preuss, Constitutionalism, in 2 ROUTLEDC ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILSOPHY 618 (Edward Craig ed.,
1998); Konstitutionalismus, 4 HISTORISCHES W6RTERBUCH DER PHILOSOPHIE 1005 (Joachim Ritter &
Karlfied Grunder eds., 1989).
10. See Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in THE EU AND THE
WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31,39 (Grginne de B6rca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001).
11. See Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism asa Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About
International Law and Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 9 (2007) (opposing the constitu-
tionalist mindset to the "managerial mindset," which replaces "law" by functionality, cost-benefit
analysis, and other forms of "ersatz normativity").
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concept of "constitutionalism" is more than the term "constitution" loaded with ma-
terial content: "Constitutionalism does not refer simply to having a constitution, but
to having a particular kind of constitution, however difficult it may be to specify its
contents."'2 Put differently, constitutionalism relates not just to the concept of consti-
tution, but to a specific conception of constitution. Constitutionalism asks for a le-
gitimate constitution. This strand of thought cannot simply be transplanted to the
international level, and one must beware of false domestic analogies. Global consti-
tutionalism is constitutionalism "in a new key."' 3 We employ the term "global con-
stitutionalism" in order to characterize an academic and political agenda which
identifies and advocates the application of constitutionalist principles, such as the
rule of law, checks and balances, human rights protection, and possibly democracy,
in the international legal sphere in order to improve the effectiveness and the fair-
ness of the international legal order. Therefore, global constitutionalism has both
descriptive and prescriptive elements. It does not merely claim to describe some fea-
tures of the status quo of international relations, but also seeks to provide arguments
for their further development in a specific direction.
"Constitutionalization" is a shorthand term both for the emergence of consti-
tutional law within a given legal order, and for the spread of constitutionalism as
a mindset. The concept of constitutionalization implies that a specific type of con-
stitution (or constitutional law), namely a constitutionalist constitution, can come
into being in a process extended through time. It also implies that legal texts can
acquire or lose constitutional properties in a positive feedback process. A text can
be more or less constitution-like and more or less constitutionalist. It may be, in
short, a constitution-in-the-making. Also, constitutionalization is multi-factorial.
The emerging constitutional profile of the international order might be well-de-
veloped in one or more areas or even special branches of law, but underdeveloped
in others. The process of global constitutionalization is not all-encompassing. It is
contingent and path-dependent. Patterns of coexistence and cooperation persist
12. See Casper, supra note 9, at 747; see also Beaud, supra note 9, at 136-42 (speaking extensively
on the "divorce" of constitution and constitutionalism); J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind, Introduc-
tion: European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE
STATE 1, 3 (J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003) (correctly pointing out "that there is a dif-
ference between constitution and constitutionalism. Constitutionalism ... embodies the values,
often non-stated, which underlie the material and institutional provisions in a specific constitution.
At this level, separating constitution from constitutionalism would allow us to claim, rightly or
wrongly, for example, that the Italian and German constitutions, whilst very different in their
material and institutional provisions, share a similar constitutionalism vindicating certain neo-
Kantian humanistic values, combined with the notion of the Rechtsstaat").
13. See Walker, supra note 10.
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even in a more constitutionalized world order. Moreover, constitutionalization is
accompanied by and may even be hampered or undone by, antagonistic, anticon-
stitutional trends in contemporary international relations, such as the fragmenta-
tion of international law, the predominance of one superpower, the privatization
of international law, and the revival of the sovereign state,'4 as manifested in the
recent financial crisis. Constitutionalization can be distinguished from legaliza-
tion 5 in that constitutional law is a special kind of law. Therefore, constitutional-
ization is more specific and also more ambitious than legalization. 6 It engenders a
"normativitE renforc6e" of a legal order. In consequence, "global constitutionaliza-
tion" is a catchword for the continuing, but not linear, process of the gradual
emergence and deliberate creation of constitutionalist elements in the interna-
tional legal order by political and judicial actors, bolstered by an academic dis-
course in which these elements are identified and further developed.
II. CONSTITUTIONALIST PROCESSES, FUNCTIONS, AND FEATURES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GOVERNANCE
In this issue, the merits of global constitutionalism as an academic approach
are analyzed from a lawyer's perspective by Anne Peters." Then Karolina Mile-
14. See Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental
International Norms and Structures, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 579, 602-05 (2006) (detailing some anti-
constitutionalist trends).
15. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401 (2000).
16. In the perspective of general systems theory, constitutions have been distinguished from or-
dinary law as follows:
[Piolitical constitutions.. . are not simply to be seen as higher legal norms, and
must instead be understood as structural coupling of'the reflexive mechanisms of
law with those of politics. The characteristic of auto-constitutional regimes is
their linkage of legal reflexive processes with reflexive processes of other societal
spheres. Reflexive in this context means the application of specific processes to
themselves, the "norming" of'norms, the application of political principles to the
political process itself, epistemology as theorizing theories, etc. Auto-constitu-
tional regimes are defined by their duplication of reflexivity. Secondary rule-
making in law is combined with defining fundamental rationality principles in
an autonomous social sphere.
Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Searchfor Legal Unity
in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999, 1016 (2004).
1Z Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397
(2009).
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wicz develops a conceptual framework of global constitutionalization from a po-
litical science perspective. 8 This framework allows for operational definitions of
various aspects of constitutionalization which are critical for any empirical analy-
sis in the field of global constitutionalization.
Such empirical analysis is undertaken by Beth Simmons, who explores the
conditions under which international legal, and arguably constitutional, norms
such as civil rights take effect. 9 She presents empirical evidence for the claim that
international organizations and norms have an independent and considerable ef-
fect on the protection individual rights. The causal chain works via mobilizing
citizens. In order to effectively implement international norms of civil rights, citi-
zens have to demand and fight for such implementation. This is hardly possible in
autocracies and hardly necessary in stable and modern democracies. Hence, the
effects of the global constitutional order can be observed most readily in countries
transitioning from autocracy to democracy.
Anne van Aaken concentrates on constitutionalism as a means to solve the
fragmentation problems of international law.2" She suggests defragmenting public
international law through a constitutional method of interpretation, namely a bal-
ancing approach. The fragmentation she has in mind is not only the emergence of
specialized issue areas and the resulting conflicts of special treaties, but also the
unbundling of constitutional functions and their dispersal on the national and
supranational level. Special issue areas, such as human rights law or environmen-
tal law, might have a "horizontal" function of guiding the interpretation of other
international rules. Van Aaken submits that the principle of "systemic interpreta-
tion," as foreseen in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Vienna Convention), allows for "practical harmonization," a technique normally
employed in constitutional law, and thus for the reconciliation of competing con-
stitutional principles with help of the principle of proportionality as a metaprin-
ciple. A constitutional balancing theory to underpin this approach is the one
formulated by Robert Alexy, which Van Aaken aligns with cost-benefit analysis
and Pareto optimality. Van Aaken then applies her method to some conflicts be-
tween investment protection and the host state's human rights objectives, such as
guaranteeing affordable water, empowering a black community, or protecting in-
18. Karolina Milewicz, Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalism: Toward a Conceptual
Framework, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 413 (2009).
19. Beth Simmons, Civil Rights in International Law: Compliance with Aspects of the "Interna-
tional Bill of Rights", 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 437 (2009).
20. Van Aaken,supra note 2.
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digenous rights in natural resources extraction. She concludes that the constitu-
tional balancing technique is an important tool for reintegrating and thereby
bolstering the legitimacy of diverse international regimes.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann also focuses on international investment law and
arbitration.2 ' He explains that multilevel constitutional restraints on abuses of
power and multilevel judicial protection have contributed to the emergence of the
rule of law as a defining element of international trade and investment law. He
points out that investor-state arbitration awards have so far contributed little to
reducing the fragmentation of international law. He suggests that the variety of
alternative dispute settlement fora for international investment disputes should
administer justice more coherently by interpreting the international treaties "in
conformity with principles of justice" and with the universal human rights obli-
gations of governments, as foreseen in the preamble of the Vienna Convention.
He suggests that "constitutional justice" is an appropriate paradigm also for com-
mercial investor-state arbitration. Petersmann concludes that "rule of law" in in-
ternational investment law and arbitration requires multilevel judicial cooperation
and more comprehensive judicial balancing of private rights and the correspond-
ing constitutional obligations of governments.
Andr6 Nollkaemper investigates whether the law of international responsibil-
ity, in view of its emerging constitutional dimensions can maintain its traditional
unity as a single set of principles that applies to all kinds of legal breaches.22 The
traditional law of state responsibility was more concerned with the protection of
"subjective" rights and to that extent resembled private law. On the other hand, the
function of the law of international responsibility has always been to protect the in-
tegrity of the entire system by reinforcing the basic structure of the sovereign equal-
ity of states. This is a constitutional function, even in the guise of a private law
model. Furthermore, the sanctioning of internationally wrongful acts is an element
of the international rule of law. This means that the law of international responsibil-
ity was never only "private" law writ large. More recently, the constitutional features
of this branch of law have been strengthened by the elimination of the requirement
of legal injury as a condition for international responsibility, and by protecting legal-
ity in a freestanding way. Also, special regimes of responsibility, notably the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), have recently focused more on
21. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice in Interna-
tional Investment Law and Arbitration, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 513 (2009).
22. Andre Nollkaemper, Constitutionalization and the Unity of the Law of International Respon-
sibility, 16 IND. I. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 535 (2009).
INTRODUCTION
"objective" illegality. The European Court of Human Rights' (ECtHR) new ap-
proach to systemic human rights deficiencies in certain member states can be seen as
a shift away from redressing individual injuries, and to that extent as a more "pub-
lic" law approach, by which the ECtHR assumes the role of a quasi-constitutional
court. In a similar fashion, the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settle-
ment mechanism is designed to bring the trade system back into a state of overall
legality, and does not, in principle, allow states to buy themselves out of it. The ques-
tion is whether the two functions of the legal regime-the redress of individual in-
jury and overall protection of the legal order-can be served by a unitary set of
principles or whether the introduction of the more "public" or constitutional ele-
ments into the regime has caused a "rupture of responsibility." Nollkaemper argues
that both paradigms can coexist, although the common ground is probably dimin-
ishing. Mechanisms to maintain unity are conceivable. However, hanging onto the
unity of the regime of international responsibility might overburden the system and
prevent much-needed further doctrinal refinement.
An important aspect of global constitutionalism is the microconstitutionaliza-
tion of special regimes. Daniel Bodansky inquires whether there is an international
environmental constitution.23 He finds that numerous international environmental
agreements are constitutional in the thin sense of establishing ongoing systems of
governance which perform basic constitutive functions, such as specifying the rules
that guide and constrain these institutions and entrenching these rules through
their amendment procedures. However, claims about the constitutional status of
international environmental law "usually serve as a shorthand for a stronger set of
claims," such as representing the law of an emerging international community with
shared responsibility and solidarity. Bodansky finds that multilateral environmental
agreements "clearly do not" establish constitutions in this thick sense, since they do
not create governance systems with significant independence from states, and they
do not effectively limit the institutions they establish. Due to these weaknesses, the
multilateral environmental agreements rather establish "a balkanized system," with
a multiplicity of regimes, each with its own constitution. Bodansky then asks
whether there is an international environmental constitution that applies to interna-
tional environmental law as a whole. He argues that the distinctive features of this
law do not amount to a constitution in any meaningful sense of the term; rather,
they represent a toolbox. The final candidate to fill the role of an international envi-
ronmental constitution is the general principles of international environmental law,
23. Bodansky, supra note 2.
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such as the duty to prevent transboundary harm. But if these principles represent a
constitution, it is "a weak and vague one."
Two articles focus on global democracy. Andreas Follesdal makes the case for
a democratic global constitution. 24 He convincingly takes issue with arguments
that see no need for democracy beyond the nation-state, and also with authors
that consider the emerging international (or at least European) order to be suffi-
ciently democratic. His contribution is an impressive review of the major argu-
ments in this debate. While showing that there is indeed a need for democracy,
F0llesdal does not answer the questions of what this global democracy should
look like or how it could be achieved.
Petra Dobner destroys hopes for an alternative mode of democracy beyond the
nation-state. 25 She criticizes the idea that global policy networks may be a major
cornerstone of a democratic global political order. Based on empirical analyses, she
enumerates the major arguments showing that global policy networks are neither
governments by the people nor, necessarily, governments for the people.
While the work by the preceding authors could be related to the "thick" un-
derstanding of constitutions, Alec Stone Sweet argues in favor of a "thin" concept:
Constitutions are meta-norms that tell us how other, lower-order legal norms are
to be produced, applied, and interpreted. 26 According to this definition, we al-
ready have global constitutional order, such as the treaty regimes of the ECHR,
the European Union (EU), or the WTO. In addition, Stone Sweet shows that
constitutional pluralism is no major objection to the idea of global constitutional-
ism. Legal pluralism also exists on the level of the nation-state. Finally, he argues
that the European Court of Justice, the Appellate Body of the WTO, and the
ECtHR meet the criteria of constitutional courts.
Thomas Cottier also advocates a pluralist and procedural, and to that extent
"thin," version of global constitutionalism.27 He considers multilayer constitutional-
ism as an intellectual framework that overcomes the classic division between domes-
tic and international law, and which permits a more coherent and rational interaction
of different regulatory layers. An important element of global constitutionalism is
24. Andreas Follesdal, When Common Interests Are Not Common: Why the Global Basic Structure
Should Be Democratic, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 585 (2009).
25. Petra Dobner, On the Constitutionability of Global Public Policy Networks, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 605 (2009).
26. Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes, 16 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621 (2009).
27. Thomas Cottier, Multilayered Governance, Pluralism, and Moral Conflict, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 647 (2009).
INTRODUCTION
therefore the allocation of powers to the various layers of governance. Cottier points
out that significance and weight, the exact contours, and the concrete consequences
of basic general principles and rights are inevitably controversial when it comes to
their application. Global governance is in that regard not categorically different
from domestic governance but different in degree. Principles of international law
and notably of international economic law, such as human rights, non-discrimina-
tion, equal conditions of competition, and the four economic freedoms in the EU,
operate much as constitutional principles. Because of the controversies about these
and other principles, Cottier argues that we need to develop appropriate peaceful
procedures of negotiation, discourse, decision-making, and dispute settlement. As
"procedures are key," shared processes ultimately determine the extent to which
global constitutionalism is viable.
III. TOWARD A RESEARCH AGENDA OF GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
The academic objectives of the contributions to this issue are to identify the
constitutional predispositions and indices in the international system, to rationally
structure the current constitutional chaos, to measure and explain constitutional-
ization beyond the nation-state, and to encourage reflection on how the process of
global constitutionalization might be broadened and intensified, and, in doing so,
to help vindicate claims for an even more constitutionalized world order. We are
also interested in the question whether constitutions beyond the nation-state are
effective and democratic, and whether the effectiveness and democratic legiti-
macy of international constitutional law can be improved. That said, we do not
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